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I must confess that, at first, it seemed very strange to me 
to be presented w i t h Spinoza as an example of a phi los-
opher to w h o m to look as a valuable historical source for 
feminist ethics. I s t i l l have problems w i t h this particular 
juxtaposi t ion, a l though I am pleased to report that Dr . 
T o m m made a far more convinc ing case than I had or ig i -
nal ly expected might be possible. T h e aspects of Spinoza 
on w h i c h she focuses her analysis are, first of a l l , his 
emphasis o n the interconnectedness of a l l existence, and 
second, the impossibi l i ty of separating reason and emo-
t ion i n his analysis of h u m a n character. Both of these 
aspects tie i n w i t h current trends i n feminist writ ings o n 
ethics. T h e first w o u l d be received sympathetically by a l l 
those w h o object to the emphasis on the i n d i v i d u a l as the 
locus of moral i ty , an emphasis w h i c h has been w i t h us for 
a l o n g time, and finds perhaps its most prominent current 
expression i n ut i l i tar ianism and contractarianism. T h e 
second ties i n w i t h the c o m m o n feminist objection that 
present, and past, ethical theories tend to place far too 
m u c h emphasis on reason over emotion i n the formula-
t ion of ethical principles. We are a l l too famil iar w i t h 
ethical man, and I have chosen the noun deliberately, 
standing alone i n the w o r l d , deciding by some rational 
and, he hopes, deductive, process what is required of h i m 
i n his present situation. T o perceive the world as Spinoza 
d id , as a w o r l d i n w h i c h each i n d i v i d u a l is i n d i v i d u a l only 
i n terms of a point of perception of a whole and i n w h i c h 
a l l indiv iduals are part of this one whole, makes it dif f icult 
to mainta in a h ighly individual is t ic stance i n morality. If 
reason and emotion are one, or at least not opposed, then 
there can be no justi f ication for exc luding emotional fac-
tors f rom an account of morali ty. W h y , then, am I st i l l 
uneasy? 
T h e first reason is that i n accepting Spinoza's uni f ied 
view of the universe we are required to accept somewhat 
more than s i m p l y the view that we are a l l interrelated and 
that moral i ty has much more to do w i t h this interrelation-
ship than it does w i t h people seen as independent entities. 
Under standard analyses of Spinoza's theory, his reality is 
w h o l l y determined, whether seen as being or becoming, 
and the order of causes is the same as the order of reasons; 
that is, reality is rational i n the very strict sense of fo l low-
i n g necessarily and inevitably the laws of logic. T h e con-
cern for others that Spinoza w o u l d have us adopt and 
express i n act ion is, roughly, the understanding that they, 
too, are w h o l l y determined i n their actions, and thus that 
praise and blame are i n a strict sense inappropriate. T h e 
truly moral person understands that a l l is as it must neces-
sarily be, and gains peace i n accepting this inevitabil ity 
and in c o m i n g to greater understanding of why things are 
as they are. 
T h i s understanding is i n terms of efficient causation; 
one of the things i n w h i c h Spinoza took pride was the 
e l iminat ion of f inal causation from our understanding of 
reality. T h u s , as just one example, to understand why 
someone acted as she d i d is to understand the factors that 
operated on her, it is not to understand her actions i n terms 
of her goals and desires, except i n so far as they count as 
part of her mental make-up pr ior to her action. Certainly 
there is interrelationship: there is one system of causality 
governing a l l of reality, but it does not appear to be the 
same sort of interrelationship that writers such as G i l l i g a n 
and Noddings, just to take the examples that T o m m uses, 
have i n m i n d when they tell us that women's morali ty is of 
a different order than men's i n taking interrelationship 
into account. In fact, this appears to be a very male version 
of interrelationship: some irresistible force controls the 
scheme of things, ordering them i n a logical fashion 
regardless of what we might want, and what we should do 
is resign ourselves to the rule of logic. 
M y second locus of uneasiness has to do w i t h the analy-
sis of emotions. T h e first aspect to w h i c h I w o u l d l ike to 
draw attention is that i n Spinoza, as T o m m has said, ideas 
and emotions are understood as two different ways of 
describing a single phenomenon. Obvious ly the attractive 
part of this is that there is not the great divide between 
reason a n d emot ion f o u n d i n other philosophers. T h e 
unattractive part is that adequate ideas should fo l low the 
rules of logic , so that we seem to be back to the o l d 
emphasis on logic as characteristic of rationality and of 
proper, and, I w o u l d assume, moral ly acceptable, h u m a n 
behaviour. It does not appear to advance the cause of 
emotions i n ethics further, if emotions do end u p as sub-
sumed under reason. N o t that I am suggesting that we 
should ignore reason i n ethical thought. I am suggesting 
that part of the drive of feminist writers in ethics has been 
to emphasize that there are more things i n our moral 
universe than logic, and I a m not sure we can get this from 
Spinoza if emotions, properly funct ioning, are the mate-
r ia l counterparts of reason, properly funct ioning . I th ink 
the source of the disagreement between T o m m and me has 
to w i t h the p l a c i n g of emphasis. If one thinks of the 
relat ion between emot ion and idea as being a n inextrica-
ble connect ion, then one seems to have two things w h i c h 
are necessarily l inked. T h i s I take it is T o m m ' s approach. 
O n the other hand, if one thinks of idea and emotion as 
being two ways of v iewing one substance, and therefore 
subject to the same laws, then one appears to have only 
one th ing , and one then has worries about the nature of 
this one t h i n g and the laws it fol lows. T h a t is my 
approach, a n d why I have di f f icul ty i n seeing this account 
of emotion as taking us very far. 
M y second problem has to do w i t h the structure of the 
emotions. For Spinoza there are three basic constituents of 
the emot ional system: conatus, or the drive for self-
maintenance or self-actualization, pleasure, and p a i n . 
Pleasure and p a i n are affects: we feel pleasure as our 
organism changes f rom lesser to greater self-actualization, 
p a i n as it moves from greater to lesser. T h e other emotions 
are a l l to be analysed i n terms of these three. It is true that 
Spinoza had a number of ins ight fu l and or ig ina l things to 
say about h u m a n behaviour and the emotions, but I am 
not sure that the schema is r i c h enough to give me the 
emotional aspects of morali ty that I want. 
For Spinoza, a l l entities are characterized by conatus. A 
physical entity is characterized by a particular propor t ion 
of m o t i o n and rest; it seeks to m a i n t a i n this p r o p o r t i o n . If 
it fails to do so, then it w i l l cease to exist, at least as this 
part icular mode of reality. O n the mental level conatus is 
characterized as the drive for self-actualization, w h i c h is 
the drive for greater understanding of the way things really 
are; i n Spinoza's terms, the replacement of inadequate 
w i t h adequate ideas. T h e reason for the comparison 
between the two levels is to demonstrate the essentially 
self-interested nature of conatus; it is self-maintenance and 
self-actualization. O n the physical level an organism is 
l ike ly to f i n d that self-maintenance involves cooperation, 
since a l l organisms are part of one whole; s imi lar ly , on the 
mental level self-actualization is not l ikely, given the unity 
of the whole, to involve trashing one's neighbour. T o 
understand the whole of w h i c h one is a part, one w i l l have 
to understand the other parts, and so one is guaranteed an 
interest i n other people: one wants to k n o w h o w they 
work. 
M y problem is that I do not think this is the sort of 
interest i n other people that I w o u l d characterize as moral 
interest. One may, of course, want other people to be at 
peace w i t h themselves, so that they w i l l leave you alone to 
get on w i t h your self-actualization. (This is Stuart H a m p -
shire's analysis of Spinoza's posit ion. 1 ) T h i s is not an 
interest i n the happiness of other people for their sakes. It 
is an interest for one's o w n sake, and as l o n g as a l l emo-
tions are to be analysed i n terms of the self-actualization of 
conatus and the pleasure and the pa in w h i c h are directly 
the results of m o v i n g towards and away from self-
actualization, I do not see h o w it can be otherwise. 
T h i s point is not controversial. T o m m says that, for 
Spinoza, "One 's obl igat ion is fundamentally to oneself" 
(p. 4). However, I see more difficulty i n reconci l ing this 
w i t h benevolence and concern for others than she does. 
T h e theory is not as egoisuc as Hobbes' , but at the least I 
a m reminded strongly of contractarian moral theory here. 
One's concern for other people is based on one's concern 
for oneself. T o m m w o u l d , of course, place her emphasis 
o n the fact that for Spinoza one is only part of the whole, so 
that i n a strict sense concern for oneself is concern for the 
whole. I, o n the other hand, f i n d myself worry ing about 
the specific mot ivat ion of the person acting. If the motiva-
t ion is self-actualization, then this does not seem to be a 
genuine expression of concern for others. It does i n any 
case seem some distance from the sort of concern for other 
people that Noddings is ta lk ing about i n Caring2. 
Another way of getting at this point is to notice that 
T o m m talks of the love of G o d and the love of other 
h u m a n beings as the same sort of love. T h e love of G o d , 
for Spinoza, is a very abstract enterprise. G o d is a l l of 
reality, the love of G o d is the intuitive appreciation of the 
interconnectedness of the whole; it is essentially a k i n d of 
understanding, a sort of mystical, rational " e m o t i o n . " 
T h i s is really not m u c h l ike the love we generally regard 
people as hav ing for one another, w h i c h is a k i n d of 
concern or caring on a less ethereal level. If the love for 
others w h i c h motivates our concern for them is this sort of 
love, then it seems to be far more impersonal than the sort 
of concern and caring that feminists have been ta lk ing 
about. T h i s difference is perhaps captured i n T o m m ' s 
"Spinoza and Vasubandhu emphasize the universality of 
the nature of personal encounter. Feminists emphasize its 
part icular i ty" (p. 21). I must confess that as far as morality 
is concerned, I w o u l d opt for the particularity. 
Another t h i n g T o m m finds appeal ing about Spinoza is 
that he provides us w i t h a metaphysical foundation o n 
w h i c h to rest these claims about the interrelationship of 
individuals and the importance of emotions for ethics. 
What if one is not tempted to accept the metaphysics 
presented? T h i s may be one of the reasons I found myself 
less than sympathetic to the prospect of seeing Spinoza's 
work as a suitable foundat ion for a feminist ethical theory. 
T h i s is not the place to debate the merits of metaphysical 
positions, but there is one feature of Spinoza's w h i c h 
makes it part icular ly problematic i n this context, and this 
is of course the determinism. Spinoza himself says that 
" g o o d " and " b a d " are only terms that reflect the pleasure 
and the p a i n of the h u m a n organism i n m o v i n g towards 
or away f rom self-actualization, and that there are no 
moral values separate from that. T h e subjectivism inher-
ent i n that c l a i m bothers me less than the problems 
involved i n creating any sort of ethical theory on a deter-
minis t ic base. N o t only a m I not attracted by a determinis-
tic metaphysics, but I regard it as a bad foundation for a 
comprehensive ethics. T h u s , on a very general level, I 
again feel some reluctance to adopt Spinoza as a source of 
ethics. 
A l l that said, it is true that feminists may wel l f i n d 
Spinoza a more sympathetic figure than others i n the 
history of phi losophy. For one thing, as T o m m points 
out, there do not appear to be any systemic reasons why he 
w o u l d have to d is t inguish between the sexes i n terms of 
rat ional or moral capacity. There is a greater sense of the 
interrelation and mutua l dependence of people than one 
finds i n , say, Locke or Aristotle. T h u s an ethic based o n 
Spinoza w o u l d not involve the competitive not ion of 
moral i ty that so many of us f i n d objectionable. We do not 
necessarily f i n d the sort of hyperrationality of a Kant, 
where it does not matter what people want or whether they 
w i l l be happy when one formulates a m o r a l pr inc ip le , so 
l o n g as no logical inconsistency results f rom one's w i l l i n g 
of that pr inc ip le . It is the case that for Spinoza, emot ion 
does play a role i n ethical behaviour, a l though I do not 
th ink it is as extensive as T o m m does. F i n a l l y , the whole 
not ion of morali ty i n the Ethics as being concerned w i t h 
h o w we should lead our lives as a whole, and not just w i t h 
a narrow part of our lives governed by some externally 
imposed set of rules, is sympathetic, and is one point at 
least on w h i c h I have always agreed w i t h Spinoza. H o w -
ever, i n the end, I s t i l l f i n d too m u c h emphasis o n the 
logica l nature of reality i n Spinoza to be able seriously to 
accept h i m as more than a m i n o r inspirat ion for feminist 
ethics. 
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No More 
Sylvia Anne why? 
Y o u are more than analyst's files or 
th in lines of i l l-used blood 
left to rot onto icy tiles 
printed like graffiti w h i c h cries 
a l l the whi le " L ive , l ive , " 
Y o u both wailed those words 
into empty stoves locked bathrooms 
asylums for incurables. 
Y o u r breath o n the mirrors spews out 
hospital white yet clean like the gowns 
you wear i n city cabs to sterile churches 
praying a l l the way " L ive , l i v e , " 
V i r g i n i a , you've walked into that river 
too often w i t h useless tones i n your pocket. 
Susan T e l l m a n 
Indiana 
